The fall of the Ottoman Empire
- Aram Solà Inaraja
- May 4, 2020
- 15 min read
‘The Ottoman Empire fell because of internal weaknesses rather than foreign intervention.’ Assess the validity of this view in the context of c. 1830-1923.
It was not the internal weaknesses but foreign intervention that brought down the Ottoman Empire in 1923. The thirst for power and territorial expansion of the Great Powers took away the territory of the Empire in Africa and Europe. The fatal wound of the Empire was the defeat in the Great War as the Allied forces imposed a harsh Peace Treaty upon it. Although this was the fatal wound, the Empire had been losing ground since the end of the 18th century due to foreign intervention. Nevertheless, such foreign intervention was justified by foreign countries because of internal weaknesses such as rise in nationalisms, like in the last Russo-Turkish War. Moreover, many times, those two factors would be linked, this is seen in events like the Greek War of Independence where the Greeks were able to defeat the Ottomans thanks to the intervention of Britain, France and Russia. Other internal factors such as the political rivalry between the Sultan and regional lords, like Muhammad Ali of Egypt, weakened the Empire as the government could not be run effectively. This led to the Tanzimat Era in which reforms were taken to centralize the government. However, such reforms increased the Ottoman dependency on European banks and caused some uprisings in different parts of the Empire. Although such internal problems did weaken the Empire, it did not destroy it. Therefore, it can be said that it was a mixture of nationalistic uprisings and foreign intervention that ended with the Empire. Nonetheless, if it hadn’t been for foreign intervention the Empire would have not collapsed in 1923.
Catherwood and Reynolds look at the decline and fall of the Empire from very different perspectives. While Reynolds’ one focuses on evaluating the rivalry between the Ottoman and the Russian Empire as well as the internal issues it suffered, Catherwood looks more at the intervention of Foreign Powers during the last years of the Empire.
Cristopher Catherwood, in A Brief History of the Middle East, argues that it was the fatal decision of joining the Central Powers in 1914[1] that ended with the Empire at the end of World War One. Moreover, he also looks at the role that Britain, and especially Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as Germany, played in determining the role the Ottoman Empire would play in the Great War. He argues that it was partly Churchill’s fault as he did not provide battleships which Germany was able to give to the Ottomans[2]. He also states that the links between the elite of the German and Ottoman military finally pushed the Ottomans into the conflict. This is convincing as the Ottomans had a friendly relation with the nations of both France and Britain during the 19th centuries in events like the Crimean War or the setup of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration[3]. Therefore, this evidence shows how it was foreign intervention that dragged the Ottomans into the war which would be the end of the Empire. Nevertheless, Catherwood undermines the other factors that brought the Ottoman Empire into the conflict such as the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. Those Empires had been involved in many conflicts during the years, always on opposing sides. Therefore, the Ottomans joined the Central Powers not only because of the actions of both Germany and Britain but because of their decision and military history. Moreover, some Ottoman bureaucrats like Enver Pasha, Minister of War from 1914 to 1918, also had an interest for the alliance with Germany and he allowed Germany vessels into the Dardanelles without informing the rest of the Cabinet[4]. This shows how some Ottoman officials were biased towards joining the Central Powers, thus meaning the Empire joined not for the actions of both Britain and Germany but for the views of its own politicians and military leaders.
Catherwood’s argument is limited as he examines only the First World War. This ignores all the past conflicts and internal problems such as nationalistic uprisings which had been weakening the Empire long before the 1910s and which brought the decline and the fall of the Empire[5]. Moreover, during many decades, not only internal problems had been weakening but also foreign intervention by all the Great Powers as the “Eastern Question” had been on the table for many years as well as the thirst for Imperialism of nations like France or Russia, seen in the many Russo-Turkish Wars as well as the French takeover of the north of Africa.
Further to this, Catherwood specialises, and is more known for his work on Winston Churchill[6]. Thus, his interpretation of the fall of the Ottoman Empire could be too focused on the role Churchill, and Britain as a whole, played, more than the Ottoman Empire itself. This is seen in the book, where he focuses on the British campaigns in the Empire, rather than how the Empire managed the War[7]. Moreover, the many books he has published show the whole of the 20th century as his area of specification, especially the period after World War One[8]. This suggests that the time period before that, which includes the whole of the decline of the Empire is a limited area for him. Subsequently, this limits on his arguments as he lacks specialist knowledge.
Michael Reynolds’ interpretation differs from that of Catherwood’s as he argues that the Empire had been in decline or many years opposed to Catherwood’s suggestion that the World War One was the reason for the fall of the Empire. He states that what changed the fate of the Empire was “a clash of irreconcilable nationalisms”[9]. Moreover, he links the military defeat to the rise in nationalism as “the creation of armies required soldiers to feel a bond with the regime”[10] and that “generating this bond became essential to state security”[11]. Without the existence of that bond, like it was in the Balkans, the security of the Empire was compromised. This is convincing, because the Ottoman institutions weren’t capable of “shaping positive identities for the Balkans”[12] Moreover, the rise of nationalists did not happen in the Balkans only but in Turkey itself with the Turkish War of Independence, which was the last event before the Sultan went into exile.
Reynolds’ argument is limited as he focuses on comparing the fall of both the Ottoman and Russian Empire, and thus emphasises the nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire as it is where it differs from the Russian Empire[13]. He considers them to be the “straightforward”[14] reason for the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the lack of military development was not only due to nationalisms but also lack of industrialisation and education[15]. Between 90 to 95 per cent of the Empire was illiterate [16] and 80 to 90 per cent of the labour force worked in the primary sector[17]. This lack of development would be translated into poor military equipment as well as low skilled military officials and professionals[18], which made the Empire very vulnerable. Thus, although the different nationalistic movements did weaken the Empire, it was not the main factor.
The approach Reynolds takes, which makes his interpretation lack validity may be influenced by the education he holds. Having a BA in Government and Slavic Languages and an MA in Political Sciences[19] may have given him a deeper understanding of the Balkans and its politics and thus focuses his work on those. Moreover, nowadays he writes about modern Turkey and the Kurds among others[20], thus focusing on the political rivalry between those two. Therefore, it is not surprising that the approach he takes on the fall of the Ottoman Empire is political as well. Nevertheless, this approach makes his thesis less convincing as he does not take into account many other factors such as underdevelopment.
The significance of internal weaknesses is reflected on the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Written at the end of the Tanzimat Period, it is valuable in assessing the reasons for the fall of the Empire as it tried to implement reforms to tackle the many internal problems that the Empire faced. The Constitutions’ status as an official document supports the value of it had an impact on the Empire during the time it was in place.
The Constitution describes the Empire as “indivisible” and “no part can ever be detached for any motive”[21] in Article 1. This shows how the priority of Midhat Pasha was to save the Empire from collapse[22] because of the many internal problems it faced such as regional nationalisms. Moreover, Article 17 makes “All Ottomans equal under the law”[23]. From this, we can see how the emphasis of part of the Constitution was to make non-Muslims equal to Muslims within the Empire to reduce the tension between those two groups[24]. Following on, in Article 8, there is the aim to unify all citizens of the Empire under the title of “Ottomans”. Therefore, it is valuable as it shows how there were many different divisions within the Empire which tried to be solved with bringing the Empire together under one constitution.
Nevertheless, the value of this document is undermined for the extend those reforms solved the Empire’s divisions. During the time it was in place, the Armenian Genocide took place. This was due to the tensions between the Christian Armenians and the Muslims in the Ottoman Army[25]. Therefore, this shows that the Constitution did not solve the problems as minorities continued to be abused.
However, the divisions during the Constitutional Eras were not because of the old divisions but because of government and foreign policy. Therefore, the source is valuable as it shows that the internal problems which would end the Empire, such as regional nationalisms with the Turkish War of Independence[26], had been in the Empire for many years.
The Ottoman Constitution was only the end of a long period of reforms started by Sultan Adbulmajid I in 1839[27] to modernize the Empire and make it competitive with European powers[28]. Although it had the aim, through the centralization of government[29], unite all the Ottoman citizens, by making the state more liberal and equal[30] for the minorities, it ended up weakening the Empire as a whole. Such modernizations were financed with European loans, which made Ottoman debt rise to 200 million pounds[31] which led to the economic dependence of the Empire on European banks[32], thus weakening the Empire’s power. Moreover, those reforms led to resistance in regions such as Albania, Bosnia and Syria. Thus, increasing the tensions between the central government and the regions.
Although it did spark division, it also had a positive economic and political impact such as the instauration of Telegraph[33] and the abolition of Slavery[34]. Therefore, it did have some positive impacts on the Ottoman society. Nevertheless, in the long run, it had more of a negative impact for the survival of the Empire than positive ones as the divisions exposed during the reforms, such as the centralization or the equality of all citizens regardless of religion, would cause the of the Empire during and after the Frist World War.
Internal warfare had also been weakening the Empire for many decades.
The War between Muhmmad Ali, Governor of Egypt and the Sultan in 1831 as a consequence of the Governor’s involvement in the Greek War of Independence, had a devastating result for the Empire. Ali, within two years, took control of Syria and Arabia and left the Empire without an army nor navy in 1839[35]. This conflict weakened the Empire as it had to appeal to the Great Powers for its own salvation[36]. After the military intervention by Italy and Britain as well as the lack of support from France, Muhammad Ali agreed to the Treaty of London on the 15th of July 1840, where he had to return the Ottoman navy and Syria back to the Sultan[37]. Therefore, this evidence shows internal conflicts for power weakened the Empire so much it relayed on the foreign powers for its survival.
Moreover, what was the de facto end of the Empire was an internal conflict as well.
After the signatory of the Armistice of Murdos on the 30th of October 1918, the Allied forces occupied parts of the Empire, such as Constantinople[38]. By this action, the Ottoman Government, including the Sultan, went under the control of the Allies. This pushed Mustafa Kemal, an army officer, to organise resistance to start the Turkish War of Independence with the aim of liberating Turkey from the invaders[39]. Straight after the Armistice of Munday, which ended the conflict, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara proceeded to abolish the Sultanate on the 23th of April. This evidence shows that it was internal weaknesses and divisions that caused the fall of the Empire as the abolition of the Sultanate is seen as the end of the Empire.
Although it is considered the end of the Empire, the Sultan had lost power since the end of World War One and the invasion of Turkey by the Allied forces. However, the end of the Empire was the abolition of the Sultanate as it was the leader of the nation.
Foreign intervention played a massive role in making the Ottoman Empire fall.
The Treaty of Constantinople is a very valuable source when assessing the role of foreign nations in the Empire’s business. Signed after the Greek War of Independence on the 21st of July, 1832[40], it is valuable in assessing the role that foreign powers played in the loss of Ottoman territory as it was an agreement between Britain, France, Russia and the Ottoman Empire[41]. The Treaty’s status as an official document with full legal power internationally reiterates its value as it was a document which had a real and massive impact on the Empire.
The Treaty aims to be fair by providing a “Definitive boundary line upon compensating, by an equitable indemnity the losses”[42]. This is restated by the “Authorities shall demand nothing for the passage from Greek vessels”[43] which shows how the Powers wanted a just agreement for the Greeks so that they can develop as a nation.
Nevertheless, the value of this source for the fall of the Empire is undermined as its purpose was to agree “a way that shall be durable and to prevent further discussion on this question”[44]. Therefore, this shows how the Great Powers’ aim was not to either weaken not make the Empire fall but to provide Greece with a stable future as a nation.
However, although maybe the main aim was not to weaken the Empire, by the loss of Greece, the Empire did lose a big portion of its European lands. Moreover, although it was economically compensated for it, the money they were given was going to run out eventually, while the Greek land would not. Therefore, the value of this source is significant as it shows that because of foreign intervention, the Empire had been losing territory and as a consequence, resources, and thus becoming weaker, for many years.
The weakening of the Empire through the loss of territory was constant in the Empire. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Empire was weakened because of foreign intervention. Due to the Russian invasion of the European part of the Ottoman Empire[45] and the signatory of the Treaty of Sant Stefano, the Ottomans had to grant independence to Romania, Serbia and Montenegro[46]. This led to the loss a big part of the European territory, the most industrialised one[47], which would have massive consequences for the Empire[48]. Although it did weaken the Empire, it was not only due to foreign intervention as the war started because of nationalistic uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria[49]. Moreover, the Russian Army was allowed to pass through Romania if this was granted independence from the Empire at the end of the war[50].
Nevertheless, the Empire lost the war and thus, was weakened after this conflict due to the Russian intervention, and thus, foreign involvement.
The loss of territory was also evident in the African part of the Empire. The growing European colonialism weakened the Empire, in places like Tunisia.
After taking loans from European powers at very high rates to finance reforms in public works, the country declared bankruptcy in 1869[51]. This led to the creation of an international commission[52] which had the de facto control of the country. However, full control by the French was not established until after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when Britain gave them support[53]. This weakened the Empire as it was losing control of part of its territory due to lack of economic planning.
Although Tunisia was part of the Empire, it had been a semi-autonomous region for many years, and the Ottoman Empire had little control over the region and therefore it made little change to the Empire’s status.
Nevertheless, Tunisia was still part of the Empire, so the French invasion made the Empire look weak and thus more vulnerable because of foreign intervention.
What erased the Empire from Africa was the Turco-Italian War of 1911 to 1912. Such conflict weakened the Empire as it took the whole of Libya and the Ottoman military was seen as weak and technologically behind[54]. Moreover, it did not only weaken the Empire because of the direct causes of the conflict, but because the rapid defeat the Ottomans suffered, encouraged the Balkan League to start the First Balkan War in 1912[55].
Although the Empire was weakened due to the victory of the Italians, such victory, happened because of the technological backwardness of the Ottoman army, therefore, it could be argued that the Ottomans were weakened not because of foreign intervention but because of internal weaknesses such as technological underdevelopment[56].
Nevertheless, what actually weakened the Empire was the loss of Libya, and that was because of the Italian victory, therefore, the Empire was weakened because of foreign intervention.
The Treaty of Sèvres is a very valuable source when assessing the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Written at the end of World War One, it is valuable in assessing the role of foreign intervention in the fall of the Empire as it was the Treaty in which the Empire was distributed between the Allies. The Treaty’s status of an international agreement between foreign countries deciding the fate of the Empire adds on the validity of the source as it shows how it was foreign intervention that caused the fall of the Empire. The Treaty only allows an army “not exceeding 50 000 men”[57] in Article 155. This shows that the purpose of the Allies was to make sure the Ottoman Empire became a redundant nation, and thus were crucial in the fall of it, as 50 000 was a very small number for the size of the country. This is reiterated with Article 232 where the annual budget has “in the first instance, be submitted to the Financial Commission”[58]. Therefore, this shows how the Allies wanted to control Turkey and reduce its power. Thus, this source is valuable in assessing the fall of the Empire as it shows how the Allied forces wanted to weaken it and basically destroy it.
Nevertheless, the value of this source is undermined as the Treaty was never in place, and thus it did not impact the Empire. Moreover, the preamble states that the Treaty should hold “a firm, just and durable peace”[59], while the consequences of such Treaty were rather the opposite with events like the Turkish War of Independence.
Nevertheless, this source is valuable, not as much for its content, as it was never in place, but for the consequences that it had, which led to the abolition of the Sultanate and thus the end of the Ottoman Empire.
During the 19th century, the Great Powers prevented the collapse of the Empire as it could have sparked a conflict between them. Nevertheless, in the 20th century, when it was clear the Empire was in its final days, the Powers started to weaken it themselves like in the Italian-Turkish war. After World War One, while Russia was in the middle of a civil war, the Allied forces struck the final blow on the Empire with the Treaty of Sèvres. This shows how foreign intervention ended with the Empire.
Ultimately, internal weaknesses were a real threat when they were supported by foreign powers. In the Turkish War of Independence, the nationalists were supported by the Russian Bolsheviks, by the provision of weapons and munition. Therefore, this shows that the fall of the Empire was thanks to the foreign support the nationalists received. Whereas when internal divisions weren’t explored by foreign powers, like the division between Muslims and non-Muslims which led to the Armenian Genocide, although it had terrible consequences for some of the Ottoman population, it did not have an impact of the stability of this. Thus, foreign intervention was the most significant factor in causing the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
Bibliography:
Books:
Catherwood, Christopher, ‘A Brief History of the Middle East’, Robinson, 2006
Reynolds, Michael A., ‘Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires’, Cambridge University Press, 2011
Vaughn Findley, Carter, ‘Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History’, Princetown University Press, 1989
Dodge, Toby, ‘Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and a History Denied, Hurst & Company, 2003
Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010
Ágoston Gábor & Masters, Bruce, ‘Encyclopaedia of the Ottoman Empire’, Facts on File Inc., 2009
Quataert, Donald, ‘The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922’, Cambridge University Press, 2005
Journal Articles:
Websites:
Online Documents:
[1] Catherwood, Christopher, ‘A Brief History of the Middle East’ Robinson, 2006, p. 156 [2] Catherwood, Christopher, ‘A Brief History of the Middle East’, Robinson, 2006, p. 156 and 157 [3] https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ottoman-empire-france-and-austria-hungary [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Pasha#World_War_I [5] https://www.historyguy.com/fall_of_the_ottoman_empire.htm [6] https://news.richmond.edu/releases/article/-/4874/catherwood-to-discuss-winston-churchill-in-annual-peple-lecture.html [7] Catherwood, Christopher, ‘A Brief History of the Middle East’, Robinson, 2006, pp. 154-188 [8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Catherwood#Selected_works [9] Reynolds, Michael A., ‘Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires’, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 4 [10] Ibid, p. 11 [11] Ibid. [12] Ibid. [13] Ibid. [14] Reynolds, Michael A., ‘Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires’, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.4 [15] Ibid, p. 12 [16] Vaughn Findley, Carter, ‘Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History’, Princetown University Press, 1989, p. 142 [17] http://ottomanempire.info/economy.htm [18] https://www.history.com/news/ottoman-empire-fall [19] https://www.fpri.org/contributor/michael-reynolds/ [20] Ibid. [21] https://ia801700.us.archive.org/35/items/jstor-2212668/2212668.pdf [22] Dodge, Toby, ‘Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and a History Denied, Hurst & Company, 2003, p. 57 [23] https://ia801700.us.archive.org/35/items/jstor-2212668/2212668.pdf [24] http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/242/the-position-of-jews-and-christians-in-the-ottoman-empire [25] https://www.britannica.com/event/Armenian-Genocide/Genocide [26] http://www.allaboutturkey.com/independence-war.htm [27] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 289 [28]https://dailyhistory.org/What_was_the_Impact_of_the_Tanzimat_Reforms_on_the_Ottoman_Empire_in_the_Nineteenth_Century%3F [29] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 289 [30] Ibid. [31] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_public_debt [32] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 72 [33] Ágoston Gábor & Masters, Bruce, ‘Encyclopaedia of the Ottoman Empire’, 2009, Facts on File Inc., p. 13 [34] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 72 [35] Ibid, p. 308 [36] Ibid [37] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-Ali-pasha-and-viceroy-of-Egypt [38] https://www.britannica.com/event/Armistice-of-Mudros [39]https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/History [40] https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/diethneis_symvaseis/1832_constantinople_treaty.doc [41] Ibid. [42] Ibid. [43] Ibid. [44] Ibid. [45] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 253 [46] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Russo-Turkish-wars [47] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 32 [48] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/russo-turkish-6.htm [49] Aksin Somel, Selcuk, ‘The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire’, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, p. 253 [50] Ibid. [51] https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia/History [52] Ibid. [53] https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Congress_of_Berlin [54] https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/italo-turkish_war_1911-1912 [55] Ibid. [56] https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/italo-turkish_war_1911-1912 [57] http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part5.html [58] http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part8.html [59] https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260

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